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Multiobjective Optimization for Demand Side
Management in Smart Grid
Dan Li, Student Member, IEEE, Hongjian Sun, Senior Member, IEEE,
Wei-Yu Chiu, Member, IEEE, and H. Vincent Poor, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Demand side management (DSM) plays an impor-
tant role in smart grid. In this paper, a hierarchical day-ahead
DSM model is proposed, where renewable energy sources (RESs)
are integrated. The proposed model consists of three layers: the
utility in the upper layer, the demand response (DR) aggregator
in the middle layer, and customers in the lower layer. The utility
seeks to minimize the operation cost and give part of the revenue
to the DR aggregator as a bonus. The DR aggregator acts as
an intermediary, receiving bonus from the utility and giving
compensation to customers for modifying their energy usage
pattern. The aim of the DR aggregator is maximizing its net
benefit. Customers desire to maximize their social welfare, i.e.,
the received compensation minus the dissatisfactory level. To
achieve these objectives, a multiobjective problem is formulated.
An artificial immune algorithm is used to solve this problem,
leading to a Pareto optimal set. Using a selection criterion, a
Pareto optimal solution can be selected, which does not favor any
particular participant to ensure the overall fairness. Simulation
results confirm the feasibility of the proposed method: the utility
can reduce the operation cost and the power peak to average
ratio; the DR aggregator can make a profit for providing DSM
services; and customers can reduce their bill.
Index Terms—Artificial immune algorithm, demand response
aggregator, demand side management, multiobjective problem,
Pareto optimality, renewable energy sources, smart grid.
NOMENCLATURE
:= Assignment operator.
α, β Compensation coefficient.
µ Bonus coefficient.
θ Mutate coefficient.
ε Dissatisfactory coefficient.
A(nc) Current antibodies.
c0() Conventional generation cost without DSM.
c1() Conventional generation cost with DSM.
cres() RESs generation cost.
f() Multiobjective problem.
fa() Objective function for the aggregator.
fc() Objective function for customers.
fu() Objective function for the utility.
fbon Bonus function.
fcom Compensation function.
fdis Dissatisfactory function.
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ffit Fitness function.
gct Power obtained from conventional generators at time
slot t.
grest Power obtained from RESs at time slot t.
gt Expected power generation at time slot t.
nc Current iteration number.
Nmax Maximum population size of antibodies.
Nnom Nominal population size of antibodies.
p∗ Selected Pareto optimal solution.
qf Electricity price per kWh.
R(nc) Clone rate.
W Total consumption of electricity in one day.
x0t Load profile at time slot t without DSM.
x1t Load profile at time slot t with DSM.
I. INTRODUCTION
REnewable energy sources (RESs) are playing an increas-ing role in power generation. For example, in the UK,
the percentage of energy derived from RESs rose from 6.7%
in 2009 to 24.6% in 2015 [1]. However, these RESs cause
intermittent problems due to their inherent characteristics,
which makes it difficult to schedule and manage conventional
generation facilities for compensating them.
Smart grid can offer a two-way flow of information and
a two-way flow of electricity. It includes several parts: smart
power generation systems, smart substations, smart power dis-
tribution networks, smart interactive terminals, smart schedul-
ing, smart building electricity, smart city power grids, smart
meters, smart appliances, and new types of energy storage
system [2], [3]. One of the key smart grid technologies is
demand side management (DSM) [4].
DSM refers to management activities that electricity utilities
adopt to achieve optimal allocation of resources and improve
the efficiency of terminal users [5]. Typically, two approaches
are generally used: 1) incentive-based DSM and 2) time-based
DSM [6]–[9]. The incentive-based DSM rewards consumers
for adjusting the load profile or giving some levels of control
over their equipments. It includes direct load control, inter-
ruptible service, demand bidding, capacity market program
and ancillary service market. An alternative way is the time-
based DSM, in which the electricity price is decided by the
generation and demand situations. Several schemes have been
proposed, e.g. critical-peak pricing, time-of-use pricing, real
time pricing and peak load reduction credits [10], [11]. It was
proved that both DSM approaches are feasible and thus widely
used for the residential sector, commercial sector and industry
sector [12]–[16].
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Although the development of DSM has a great future,
the application of DSM in residential sector still has many
problems. Due to the large scale of customers, the generation
side is less likely to negotiate directly with each customer. In
this context, an intermediary/representative is needed [17]. An
aggregator, as the name implies, bundles a group of customers
into a cluster, and therefore becomes an important aspect to
the grid. In the UK, the demand response (DR) aggregator
is allowed and supported by the government in the power
network. There already exists several DR aggregators in the
market, e.g., UK Power Reserve Ltd, KiWi Power Ltd, Npower
Ltd, and ESP Response Ltd [18]. As shown in Fig. 1, the
DR aggregator can bring several benefits into the system: for
distribution system operators (DSOs), it can achieve peak-load
shaving and distributed generation (DG) supply optimization;
for retailers, it can help with the internal portfolio balancing;
for market, it can deliver day-ahead/hour-ahead optimization,
frequency control and power reservation [7].
In [19]–[21], the role of the DR aggregator that balances
the generation and demand was studied. When the imbalance
occurred, an indirect signal was given in [19], and the DR
aggregator solved a quadratic program at each time slot.
In [20], customers are willing to modify their consumption
profile according to the electricity price. The DR aggregator
represented customers to bid energy in the market. In [21],
the regulatory, economic and technical perspectives of critical-
peak pricing were examined. The aggregator decided when
to employ the critical-peak price. In [19]–[21], the role of
the aggregator was involved, but the utility function was
not explicit. Only benefits for the generation side and the
customer side were considered, while the benefit for the DR
aggregator was neglected. In [17], [22], the DR aggregator
was mentioned, the layered structure and biding scheme were
used. The model in [17] included the utility, DR aggregators,
and customers. The utility provided rewards to aggregators for
providing DR services, and customers can receive monetary
compensation for their demand adjustment. In [22], The utility
set the target for demand curtailment at a certain time slot. The
aggregator tried to achieve this target by providing rewards
to customers, aiming to minimize its payment. Customers bid
their supply function to the aggregator, aiming to minimize the
dissatisfaction. However, in [17], [20], [22], only the conven-
tional generation was considered. In [23]–[25], the hierarchical
system was also presented, and the game theory was used to
solve the problem. In [23], [24], multiple utilities were in-
volved. Utilities aimed to maximize the profit, while customers
aimed to maximize the individual welfare. A Stackelberg game
was established based on that to solve the problem. In [25],
utilities were divided into two types, fossil-fuel based and
RESs based. The uncertainty of supply was considered. A
utility selection program which can minimize customers’ costs
was proposed. But in [23]–[25], the inconvenience caused by
DR program for customers was not detailed.
Although extensive studies of DSM programs have been
conducted, there are several gaps for implementing an effective
DSM:
• The DR aggregator has already emerged as an individual
unit in the market, so the revenue of it needs to be
Fig. 1. Functionality of the DR aggregator in a power grid [7].
analyzed to support the underlying power system.
• For customers, only considering consumption billing is
not comprehensive. The quality of electricity service/the
satisfactory level should also be included. The consider-
ation of this can promote active participation of DSM in
practical situations.
To tackle these issues, this paper formulates a multiobjective
problem (MOP). For maximizing the benefits of all partici-
pants, an artificial immune algorithm (AIA) is proposed, lead-
ing to a Pareto optimal set. After a selection, a Pareto optimal
solution can be obtained, which ensures a fair implementation
of DSM [26]. Overall, the main contributions of this paper can
be summarized as below:
• The inherent intermittent problems of RESs can be ad-
dressed by the proposed DSM scheme.
• The DR aggregator is modelled as an independent par-
ticipant. The role and the revenue of it are analyzed.
• For customers, the social welfare is considered. It is
presented by the received compensation minus the dis-
satisfactory level caused by DSM.
• The UK actual daily data of electricity generation and de-
mand from Grid Watch are applied to prove the feasibility
and effectiveness of the proposed model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces a hierarchical model for the day-ahead market,
which includes the utility, the DR aggregator and customers.
Section III formulates an MOP, and proposes the AIA and
the selection criterion. It can work out a Pareto optimal set
and select an optimal solution. Section IV provides a practical
case study. Finally, Section V concludes this paper and lists
the future research.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, the day-ahead market is considered and a
hierarchical framework for grid participants is introduced. This
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framework can help to define the specific role and goal of each
participant. The system operation model is shown in Fig. 2.
The utility is at the upper layer to supply electricity; the DR
aggregator is at the middle layer to communicate with both
the utility and customers; customers are at the lower layer to
consume electricity from the utility [17], [22].
Fig. 2. System operation model.
A. The role of the utility
In the day-ahead electricity market, the daily demand of
electricity fluctuates with the time according to customers’
behavior. What is more, due to the inherent intermittent
character of RESs, the power provided by RESs varies with
the external environment conditions, e.g. season, weather and
time period. In order to balance the demand and the supply,
the generation side needs to adjust the production, activate
the standby power plants, or even purchase power from third
parties [27], [28]. The term peak-to-average ratio (PAR) is
introduced to describe the stability of the system [29]:
PAR =
Peak Load
Average Load
. (1)
The cost of generation consists of two parts: conventional
generation cost and maintenance cost of RESs. For the con-
ventional generators, the cost and the marginal cost are propor-
tional to the total supplied electricity. The marginal cost means
the incremental cost of each new unit of production. Thus
the cost function c(·) is a strictly increasing convex function,
modelled by a quadratic equation in this paper [15], [23], [25],
[30]. For RESs, as there is no expense for resources, the cost is
mainly due to the maintenance. Thus the cost function cres(·)
is a constant value and independent of supplied electricity.
(Note: The installation of conventional generators and RESs
are not considered in this paper.)
Let qf denotes the selling price of per unit electricity. The
total consumption for one day is W MWh. For the day-ahead
market, the daily generation vectors are gc = {gct : t ∈ T} for
conventional generators and gres = {grest : t ∈ T} for RESs.
The utility aims to maximize the net revenue. Without the use
of DSM, the objective of the utility can be given by
max
gc,gres
:
∑
t∈T
qfx
0
t − [
∑
t∈T
c0(gct ) +
∑
t∈T
cres(grest )] (2)
s.t. :
∑
t∈T
grest +
∑
t∈T
gct >
∑
t∈T
x0t ,
gct,min 6 gct 6 gct,max, (3)
grest,min 6 grest 6 grest,max,
where x0t denotes the aggregated consumption at time slot
t without the DSM, c0 and cres denote the generation cost
for conventional generators and RESs without the DSM,
respectively. When the DSM is applied to customers, the peak
demand and the total generation cost could be reduced to a
certain degree. In this paper, the DR aggregator is considered
as the operator to implement the DSM. The utility will be
willing to share part of the saved cost as bonus to the DR
aggregator as an incentive. The bonus can be calculated as
[17]
fbon = ∆c(g
c
t ) = µ
∑
t∈T
[c0(gct )− c1(gct )] (4)
where c1 denotes the generation cost for conventional gen-
erators with the DSM, and µ ∈ [0, 1) denotes the bonus
coefficient. When µ = 0, it means there is no bonus to the
DR aggregator, therefore indicates no DSM is implemented in
the system.
In order to ensure the basic needs, there is no curtailment
in demand. The flat price is chosen in this price, therefore the
total revenue from customers is fixed. The aim of the utility
can be defined as minimizing the operational cost. Hence, the
objective function of utility becomes
min
gc
: fu(g
c) =
∑
t∈T
[
c1(gct ) + ∆c(g
c
t )
]
(5)
s.t. : 0 6 ∆c(gct ), 0 6 µ < 1, (6)
gct,min 6 gct 6 gct,max.
The first term of (5) corresponds to the generation cost for
conventional generators, and the second term corresponds to
the bonus given to the DR aggregator.
B. The role of the DR aggregator
The DR aggregator can group a number of individual cus-
tomers into a cluster for the purpose of carrying more weight
in the market. The DR aggregator acts as a mediator between
the utility and customers. It undertakes dual responsibilities:
on the one hand, ensuring DSM service can be provided to
the utility, therefore obtaining the bonus; on the other hand,
guaranteeing there will be a reduction in the electricity bill of
customers, encouraging customers to actively participate in a
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DSM program. By performing the duty, DR aggregator can
help with the security and efficiency of the supply.
The DR aggregator tries to adjust customers’ consumption
pattern to smooth the peak and follow the generation pattern.
The ideal scenario is the demand completely following the
generation. Because of the participation of DSM, customers
can receive compensation from the DR aggregator for the in-
convenience it may cause. The compensation scheme depends
on the difference between the aggregated consumption vector
x1 =
{
x1t : t ∈ T
}
and the generation expectation vector
g = {gt : t ∈ T} at time slot t. Suppose the generated power
from conventional power plants is a constant value I at each
time slot, and the generated power from RESs is time-varying
represented by gres = {grest : t ∈ T}, thus, the expected
generation vector is g = {gt = I + grest : t ∈ T}. To make
demand follows supply, the difference between generation and
consumption should be reduced. A compensation function is
introduced at that point to promote DSM and can be modelled
by a quadratic equation [17]
fcom =
∑
t∈T
[
−α (x1t − gt)2 + β] (7)
s.t. : α > 0, β > 0, (8)
where α and β are compensation coefficients.
The objective of the DR aggregator is to maximize its
net payoff. Since the aggregator receives the bonus from the
utility and provides compensations to customers, the objective
function can be given by
max
gc,x1
: fa(g
c, x1) =
∑
t∈T
{µ∆c(gct )− [−α(x1t −gt)2 +β]} (9)
s.t. : x1t > 0 ∀t ∈ T, xt,min 6 x1t 6 xt,max. (10)
gct,min 6 gct 6 gct,max.
The first term of (9) corresponds to the received bonus from
the utility, and the second term corresponds to the compensa-
tion to customers.
C. The role of customers
Typically, customers’ electricity consumption causes a peak
demand around 17:00 to 22:00 and a valley demand around
0:00 to 6:00 [31]. As explained before, a group of customers
are organized as a cluster. The reference aggregated electricity
demand at the time slot t is defined as x0 =
{
x0t : t ∈ T
}
, and
the total demand for one day is
∑
t∈T x
0
t = W .
Smart meters can provide customers detailed information
about their electricity consumption. By equipping them, cus-
tomers can have a comprehensive understanding of their usage.
And customers are assumed to be price-sensitive. With the
financial incentive, they are willing to modify their con-
sumption pattern by adjusting deferrable appliances to some
extent. After the negotiation with the DR aggregator, the
aggregated consumption vector becomes x1 =
{
x1t : t ∈ T
}
,
and
∑
t∈T x
1
t ≥W . (Note: The energy conservation approach
is not considered in this paper.)
Clearly, DSM would cause inconvenience on customers’
daily life. The incurred discomfort should be considered. It
depends on the difference between the actual consumption and
the reference consumption. As this difference increases, the
marginal discomfort also increases. Hence the dissatisfactory
function should be convex and can be modelled by a quadratic
equation [17]
fdis = ε
(
x1t − x0t
)2
, (11)
s.t. : ε > 0, xt,min 6 x1t 6 xt,max, (12)
where ε is the inelasticity coefficient of demand that charac-
terizes consumers’ personal preference. A larger ε means the
consumption modification will result in more discomfort, and
vice verse. The objective of customers is to maximize their
social welfare
max
x1
: fc(x
1) =
∑
t∈T
{[−α(x1t −gt)2 +β]−ε(x1t −x0t )2} (13)
s.t. : α > 0, β > 0, ε > 0,
x1t > 0 ∀t ∈ T,
∑
t∈T
x1t >W, (14)
gct,min 6 gct 6 gct,max, xt,min 6 x1t 6 xt,max.
The first term of (13) corresponds to the received compensa-
tion from the DR aggregator, and the second term corresponds
to the dissatisfactory level.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, an MOP is formulated for maximizing
the benefits of all participants. An AIA is then proposed
to solve the problem. To stabilize the normal operations of
the electricity market, it is important to maintain the fairness
among all participants.
A. Formulation
To maintain fairness, three objectives are considered. The
objective of utility is to minimize the operation cost, i.e.,
the generation cost plus the bonus to the DR aggregator.
The objective of the DR aggregator is to maximize the net
income, i.e., the bonus from the utility minus compensation
to customers. The objective of customers is to maximize the
social welfare, i.e., the compensation from the DR aggregator
minus the dissatisfactory level. By considering the day-ahead
market, the resultant MOP can be formulated as
min
gc
: fu(g
c) =
∑
t∈T
[
c1(gct ) + µ∆c(g
c
t )
]
(15)
min
gc,x1
: −fa(gc, x1) =
∑
t∈T
[−µ∆c(gct )− α
(
x1t − gt
)2
+ β]
(16)
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min
x1
; −fc(x1) =
∑
t∈T
[
α
(
x1t − gt
)2 − β + ε (x1t − x0t )2]
(17)
s.t. : x1t > 0 ∀t ∈ T,
∑
t∈T
x1t >W,
fa(g
c, x1) > 0, fc(x
1) > 0, (18)
gct,min 6 gct 6 gct,max, xt,min 6 x1t 6 xt,max
which is solved hourly. To ensure that all the constraints can be
strictly followed, an additional objective fr(x) is introduced
to simplify (18)
fr(g
c, x1) =
∑
[max(−fa(gc, x1), 0) + max(W −
∑
t∈T
x1t , 0)
+ max
(−fc(x1), 0)+ max (−x1t , 0)]
(19)
The constraints in (18) hold true if and only if fr(x) = 0.
Using (19), the resulting MOP can be written as:
min
gc,x1
: f(gc, x1) =
[
fu(g
c), −fa(gc, x1), −fc(x1), fr(gc, x1)
]
(20)
If the MOP is feasible, there should be a possible consump-
tion schedule satisfying all the requirements. To address the
process, Pareto optimality is used [26].
Definition 1 (Pareto Optimality): A state of allocation pro-
cedure, in which it is impossible to improve one participant’s
situation without making at least one participant’s situation
worse.
Definition 2 (Pareto Dominance): For a strategy set with
H as the minimum objective function, each vector in the set
means a possible strategy. For two different vectors u and k, k
is Pareto dominated by u if H(u)i ≤ H(k)i holds true for all
i and at least one inequality exists, where i is the ith element
of objective vector. It means the strategy u can make at least
one participant better without making anyone worse than the
strategy k .
Definition 3 (Pareto Optimal Solution): A strategy p is a
Pareto optimal solution if p is feasible and there are no other
strategies that dominate it.
Definition 4 (Pareto Optimal Set): The collection of Pareto
optimal solutions is termed a Pareto Optimal Set.
Definition 5 (Pareto Front (PF)): When plotted in the
objective space, the image of Pareto Optimal set is termed
Pareto Front.
B. Algorithm
To attain the Pareto Optimal Set for MOP, the AIA can
be used [26], [32], [33]. The AIA is a global search method
that uses an iterative process. Compared to traditional search
algorithms, AIA is easy to use, robust, and suitable for parallel
processing. In using the AIA, the terminology antibody is used
to describe a point in the decision variable space.
Fig. 3 shows flowchart of the AIA algorithm used to solve
the MOP in (20). The antibody p represents the decision
variables x1 in the MOP. A group of antibodies are first
randomly generated over the interval [Pmin, Pmax] following
the uniform distribution, where Pmin and Pmax are the
minimum and maximum values of the decision variables, re-
spectively. Dominated antibodies are removed gradually. Next,
gene operation is applied to the nondominated antibodies.
The antibodies then mutate in order to produce a diversified
population. The dominated antibodies are removed as well.
After that, the condition fr(p) = 0 is used to eliminate
the infeasible antibodies. If the population size is still too
large, the antibody population update operation will be adopted
till the population size reduces to Nnom. The above process
repeats until the maximum number of iteration is reached.
At this stage, a Pareto optimal set is obtained. According to
the selection criterion, the most fit antibody is chosen as the
output, which can maximize the minimum improvement in all
dimensions. This solution can maintain fairness, and does not
favour any particular participants. Detailed search steps are
described as follows.
Step 1: Generate the initial population of antibodies ran-
domly. Let nc = 0 and
A(0) = {p1, p2, p3, ...pnom} (21)
where pi is a random vector from [Pmin, Pmax].
Step 2: Remove dominated antibodies and maintain the
nondominated antibodies.
Step 3: Mutate the remaining nondominated antibodies. The
current population is
A(nc) = {p1, p2, p3, ...p(nc)} (22)
The current population size is NP (nc) = ‖A(nc)‖. Define the
clone rate as
R (nc) = b Nmax
Np(nc)
c (23)
where b.c is a floor function. The clone and mutation operation
is implemented to each element p in the set A(nc), according
to the equation
pji = θpi + (1− θ)p
′
i (24)
where θ is randomly chosen from [0, 1], and p
′
i is a random
vector belonging to [Pmin, Pmax]. Through the mutation, a
new set of antibodies is produced
C =
{
p11, p
2
1, ..., p
R(nc)−1
1
}
∪
{
p12, p
2
2, ..., p
R(nc)−1
2
}
∪ ... ∪
{
p1Np(nc), p
2
Np(nc)
, ..., p
R(nc)−1
Np(nc)
}
.
(25)
Let A(nc) := A(nc) ∪ C.
Step 4: Repeat Step 2, and remove the dominated antibodies
from the new population.
Step 5: The remaining antibodies are all nondominated, but
not all of them are feasible. The antibodies with fr(p) > 0
are not applicable for the MOP formulated in this paper. The
antibodies with the largest fr(p) will be removed first. If
fr(p1) > fr(p2) > 0, then p1 is removed first. The process
continues until the condition fr(p) = 0 holds true for all
antibodies.
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Fig. 3. Flowchart of the AIA algorithm.
Step 6: After Step 4 and Step 5, if the population size is still
larger than the nominal size, the antibody population update
procedure needs to be applied to normalize the antibodies. For
a crowded region, a fitness value is allocated to antibodies
ffit(pn) =
J∑
j=1
F (pn)j − F (pn−1)j
Fnc,upj − Fnc,lowj
(26)
where J is the number of objectives, Fnc,upj = max
p∈A(nc)
F (p)j
and Fnc,lowj = min
p∈A(nc)
F (p)j .
The antibody with the smallest fitness value will be removed
first. If ffit(p1) > ffit(p2), then p2 is removed first. The
procedure stops when the current population size is no large
than the nominal size. It is noted that this procedure will not
be carried out for extreme vectors in F (P ), where extreme
vector means at least one element in this vector reaches its
extreme value, i.e, F (p′) is an extreme vector if there exists j
such that F (p′)j = maxp∈A(nc) F (p)j or minp∈A(nc) F (p)j .
Step 7: Let nc = nc + 1 and A(nc + 1) = A(nc). Repeat
Step 3 to Step 7, until nc = nmax.
Step 8: As the iteration counter nc increases gradually,
A(nc) forms a Pareto optimal set. All vectors in it are possible
solutions to F (P ). A solution that can maximize the minimum
improvement in all dimensions is selected as the output. This
output can guarantee the fairness among all the participants
rather than giving advantage to one particular participant. The
criterion can be written as
p? = arg max
p∈A(nmax)
min
j=1...J
Fupj − F (p)j
FupJ − F lowj
(27)
where Fupj = max
p∈A(nmax)
F (p)j and F lowj = min
p∈A(nmax)
F (p)j .
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, a practical case study is presented. The
modelled system consists of one utility with 2500 wind tur-
bines, one aggregator and one cluster of customers. The utility
comprises 2500 wind turbines with the rating of 2.75MW. In
the day-head market, a calendar day is equally divided into 24
time slots, i.e., T = 24. The UK actual daily data from Grid
Watch is fed into the model. The UK average electricity price
0.18 £/kWh is applied. For conventional generators, the cost
function is given as
c(gct ) = 5(g
c
t )
2 + 400gct + 100 £/GWh (28)
For RESs, wind power is considered. The wind speed vt in
m/s can be predicted in advance. The relationship between
the output power zt in MW and vt is set as [34]
zt = σ(τ, ψ)
ρS
2
v3t (29)
where the performance coefficient σ(τ, ψ) can be calculated
from experiential arithmetic, based on the blade tip speed ratio
τ and blade pitch angle ψ. The air density and swept area are
set as ρ = 1.225 kg/m3 and S = 1257 m3. The rated wind
speed and maximum wind speed are specified as: vrate =
15 m/s and vmax = 30 m/s. When vt > vmax, vt = 0,
since the extreme fast speed will produce an undesirable large
moment on the blade, which may damage the wind turbine,
so the turbine will be forced to stop for safety. When vrate <
vt < vmax, vt = vrate, since the turbine is already fully
operated when the wind speed reaches the rated speed. Even
with a faster wind speed, the turbine is not able to generate
more power. Fig. 4(a) shows the statement above, and Fig.
4(b) shows the predicted wind power output gres for the day-
ahead market. The electricity generated from wind turbines
will be consumed first. The remaining electricity demand will
be satisfied by the conventional power generators.
For the utility, the bonus coefficient µ = 0.7 in (3) has been
set, indicating 70% of the DSM gain will be given to the DR
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Fig. 4. The wind turbine output performance.
Fig. 5. The example of Pareto Front.
aggregator. For the DR aggregator, the compensation strategy
is defined as
fcom =
∑
t∈T
[−0.01(x1t − gt)2 + 30]. (30)
For customers, it is assumed 20% of the load profile can
be deferred with xt,max = 1.2xt and xt,min = 0.8xt. The
dissatisfactory function is given by
fdis = 0.01(x
1
t − x0t )2. (31)
Using the AIA, the Approximate Pareto Front (APF) for
the day-ahead market model can be generated. Fig. 5 gives an
example of the APF. It illustrates the interaction between three
objectives. For a solution p, if an arbitrary element yields an
extreme objective value F (p)j = F
up
j or F (p)j = F (p)
low
j ,
it means this solution advantages a particular participant. To
ensure the fairness, an optimal solution p∗ can be chosen
based on the APF by using (27), which can maximize the
minimum improvement in all dimensions. As shown in Fig.
5, the selected optimal solution p∗ is located in the centre
of the APF graphically. It proves that through the proposed
multiobjective approach, a fair design can be obtained.
Fig. 6 shows the optimized load profile and the reference
load profile in the UK for the selected day, 5th May 2017.
It is clearly shown that after the optimization, during the off-
Fig. 6. The optimized usage pattern for the day-ahead market.
peak time (i.e., 0:00-6:00), the demand increases. While during
the peak-time (i.e., 17:00-22:00), the demand decreases. The
utility, the DR aggregator, and customers can benefit from
using the proposed approach. The detailed information can be
found in Table. 1 below.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THE REFERENCE LOAD PROFILE AND THE OPTIMAL
LOAD PROFILE IN THE UK, 5TH MAY 2017
Reference
Load Profile
Optimized
Load Profile
Total (GWh) 2892 2898
Average (GW) 120.5 120.8
PAR 1.182 1.119
Generation Cost (£) 2956774 2951090
Bonus to DR aggregator (£) – 12632
Compensation to Customers (£) – 620
For that day, the utility can save £ 5684 for the generation
cost. The PAR is reduced about 5.33%, from 1.182 to 1.119.
By providing the DSM, the DR aggregator can make a profit
of £ 12632. For customers, the electricity bill can be cut down
by £ 620 in total.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a multiobjective optimization ap-
proach for enabling DSM. A hierarchical framework has been
studied, which consists of the utility, the DR aggregator,
and customers. The role of the DR aggregator has been
defined as an intermediary communicating with both the utility
and customers. The modelled system has led to an MOP,
which can be solved by the AIA. Through the proposed
AIA, a Pareto optimal set has been obtained. After that,
a Pareto optimal solution has been selected that maximizes
the minimum improvement in all dimensions. The simulation
results have shown that all the participants can benefit from
the proposed design: the utility can reduce the generation
cost; the DR aggregator can make profit by providing DR
service; customers can save money on their bill. For future
research, the focus will be on two research topics. The first
topic is to develop a fair allocation mechanism among the
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customers that meets their needs. The second topic is related
to a feasible information exchange method that can protect
customers’ privacy.
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